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s the euro crisis unfolds, it is becoming more and more obvious that this is a self-
inflicted crisis, one made possible by systematic mismanagement by the European 
leaders.  
We now start to understand that financial markets in a monetary union can force individual 
governments into default, even governments that are willing and capable of servicing their 
debt. It is sufficient that investors fear some payment difficulties for a devilish dynamics to 
be set in motion in which government bonds are massively sold, creating a sudden stop in 
liquidity provision and making it impossible for governments to service the debt without 
outside help. Thus, fear and panic can in a self-fulfilling way drive countries into default. 
Fear  and  panic  are  now  the  driving  forces  in  the  eurozone,  splitting  the  area  into  two 
situations, pushing some into bad equilibria characterised by austerity and recession, and 
others into good equilibria allowing their governments to borrow at almost no cost.  
Even today the European Central Bank does not seem to recognise this problem. As a result, 
its strategy has been to wait and see. Thus, last year it waited until the sovereign debt crisis 
had  sufficiently  damaged  the  banking  system  and  risked  provoking  an  implosion.  As  it 
approached the precipice, it decided to act and to provide massive amounts of liquidity to 
banks that were a multiple of what would have been necessary had the ECB acted earlier. 
Today as the eurozone is hanging once again over the precipice, the ECB is sitting on the 
sidelines waiting for worse to come.  
The problem with this strategy is that immense damage is being inflicted on confidence in 
the sustainability of the eurozone. With each new crisis, existential fears about the future of 
the eurozone become more intense. Nothing undermines the stability of the eurozone more 
than the growing fear that it has no future. And the ECB, which is the only institution that 
could calm these fears, is doing nothing. Existential fears are thus allowed to do their slow 
destructive work of undermining the eurozone.  
The European Commission has shown an equal capacity of mismanaging the crisis. Pushed 
by the creditor nations and the panicky financial markets, it is forcing eurozone countries to 
accelerate austerity measures in the midst of a recession. As a result, the debt-to-GDP ratios 
increase as the denominator in this ratio is shrinking faster than the numerator. Countries 
end up with a higher debt burden, which triggers more panic reactions in the markets.  
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Again there is a failure to understand what is going on. The excess debt accumulation in the 
South is matched by an excess accumulation of claims in the North. The correct response 
would  be  to  force  the  deficit  countries  to  reduce  spending  and  the  surplus  countries  to 
increase spending. The European Commission’s strategy, however, forces all the adjustment 
on  the  deficit  countries  without  imposing  a  symmetric  and  opposite  adjustment  on  the 
surplus countries. As a result, the eurozone is forced into a deflationary straitjacket.  
This strategy is doomed to fail, as those who are subjected to the deflationary treatment 
show symptoms of rejection. It also leads to antagonism and conflict within the eurozone. 
Southern  countries  are  set  up  against  the  Northern  creditor  countries.  The  European 
Commission, which should promote the interests of the system as whole, has become the 
agent representing the interests of the creditor nations. Instead of unifying the eurozone, the 
European Commission is contributing to disunity and conflict.  
The correct response to the crisis consists of three elements, each of which is essential. First, 
the  ECB  should  step  in  to  stop  panic  and  fear  from  undermining  the  stability  of  the 
eurozone. It can do this by announcing that government bond rates of solvent but illiquid 
nations (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland) will not be allowed to exceed a certain level (say, 
300 basis points above the German government bond rate). The ECB is the only institution 
that can guarantee this, and that can stop the spread of existential fear that is destroying the 
eurozone. The EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) and the future ESM (European 
Stability  Mechanism)  have  limited  resources  and  cannot  credibly  commit  to  such  an 
outcome. 
Second, the European Commission should tell deficit and surplus countries alike to make the 
necessary adjustments. For the deficit countries, this means austerity, albeit spread over a 
longer period. While the European Commission travels to the deficit countries and preaches 
austerity, it should also go to the surplus countries and urge them to stop trying to balance 
the budget when the eurozone risks moving into a recession. The European Commission’s 
message should be that budget deficits in these countries are good for them and for the 
system.  
Finally, a budgetary union is a key ingredient of a sustainable monetary union. A budgetary 
union, however, is a long-term project. There is little prospect of achieving it quickly. What 
can be done quickly, however, is the issuance of common Eurobonds. This approach has the 
merit of signalling to the market that irreversible steps towards budgetary union are being 
taken  today,  thereby  assuaging  the  existential  fears  that  are  destabilising  the  eurozone. 
Clearly many problems will have to be overcome in order to launch Eurobonds (see Gros, 
2012), but the approach outlined above has the merit of at least starting a process that is 
unavoidable if one wishes to maintain the euro.  
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